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Accountability in the Deep State
Heidi Kitrosser

ABSTRACT
In October of 2017, Joel Clement—a federal civil servant who had headed the U.S. Interior
Department’s Office of Policy Analysis since 2011—wrote a stinging resignation letter to Interior
Secretary Ryan Zinke. In it, Clement accused Zinke and President Trump of having “waged an
all-out assault on the civil service by muzzling scientists and policy experts like myself.” The
story behind Joel Clement’s resignation—a story still unfolding as of this Article’s writing
in 2018—provides a window into the relationship between the political leadership and the
civil service at the Interior Department in the first year of the Trump administration. It
also serves as a jumping-off point to revisit the value in having a civil service with some
independence from politics, and to consider mechanisms to protect that independence.
This Article explores those questions through the lens of Clement’s resignation.

AUTHOR
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am very grateful to Katherine Atkinson, Louis
Clark, and Joel Clement for taking time out of their very busy schedules to allow me to interview
them.
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INTRODUCTION
Since taking office, President Trump and his supporters have railed
repeatedly against the “deep state.”1 By the deep state, they appear to mean, in
substantial part, the civil servants—including career scientists, lawyers, national
security analysts, economists, and administrative personnel—who comprise
much of the federal government.2 These career bureaucrats, President Trump
and his supporters charge, are insufficiently loyal to the president and his
agenda.3 As Paul Verkuil, who chaired the Administrative Conference of the
United States from 2010 through 2015, puts it, “[t]he career bureaucracy is seen
by many in the administration, and by the president himself, as sort of the
problem.”4 Many civil servants, in turn, reportedly feel demoralized and worried
both about their job security and their respective agencies’ futures.5
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

See Charles S. Clark, Deconstructing the Deep State, GOV’T EXEC.,
http://www.govexec.com/feature/gov-exec-deconstructing-deep-state [https://perma.cc/
B4GF-B62E]; Michael Crowley, The Deep State Is Real but It Might Not Be What You
Think, POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 5 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/
09/05/deep-state-real-cia-fbi-intelligence-215537 [https://perma.cc/4UG3-2U74]; Adam
Gopnik, The J.F.K. Files, Trump, and the Deep State, NEW YORKER (Oct. 29, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-jfk-files-trump-and-the-deepstate [https://perma.cc/9KDL-THJN]; Jon D. Michaels, Trump and the “Deep State”—The
Government Strikes Back, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 15 2017), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/2017-08-15/trump-and-deep-state [https://perma.cc/K6MG-9JFB].
See Clark, supra note 1 (characterizing Trump allies’ complaints about “the deep state” as
directed mostly at career federal bureaucrats); Gopnik, supra note 1 (deeming complaints
about the “deep state” to stem from concerns that “there are civil servants or functionaries
within the government whose chief trait is loyalty to the Constitution and to the ongoing
administration of the state”); Crowley, supra note 1 (“To Trump and his allies, the new
president is now the victim of conspiratorial bureaucrats . . . .”); Michaels, supra note 1
(explaining that current critics of the “deep state” largely have career bureaucrats in mind).
See supra note 1.
Charles Flavelle & Benjamin Bain, Washington Bureaucrats Are Quietly Working to
Undermine Trump’s Agenda, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/features/2017-12-18/washington-bureaucrats-are-chipping-away-attrump-s-agenda [https://perma.cc/T543-A9SM]; see also Paul R. Verkuil: Senior Fellow,
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., https://www.acus.gov/contacts/paul-r-verkuil (noting that
Verkuil chaired the ACUS for a five-year term beginning on April 6, 2010).
See, e.g., JACOB CARTER ET AL., SIDELINING SCIENCE SINCE DAY ONE (July 2017),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/07/sidelining-science-report-ucs-7-202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV7S-KVKG]; Emily Atkin, It’s Never Been Harder to Be a Climate
Scientist, NEW REPUBLIC (July 27, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144056/its-never-harderclimate-scientist [https://perma.cc/7BXL-KGN8]; Devin Henry, Federal Employees Step up Defiance
of Trump, HILL (Aug. 5, 2017, 4:55 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/345404federal-employees-step-up-defiance-of-trump [https://perma.cc/5B36-XN3N].
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Recent events at the U.S. Department of the Interior (the Department)
present a microcosm of this dynamic. Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke’s attitude
toward the career bureaucrats was captured in comments that he made to a large
gathering of the National Petroleum Council. He told the group that he realized,
upon arriving at the Department, that “I got 30 percent of the crew that’s not
loyal to the flag.”6 Zinke was quickly rebuked for these remarks by a bipartisan
group of former Department political appointees. The former officials wrote to
Zinke that “[t]he Department’s career employees swear to defend the
Constitution; they do not swear personal allegiance to individual Secretaries or
to anyone else.”7 And in a stinging resignation letter, Joel Clement—who
headed the Department’s Office of Policy Analysis (OPA) from 2011–2017 as a
senior career official—told Zinke that “[y]ou and President Trump have waged
an all-out assault on the civil service by muzzling scientists and policy experts
like myself . . . .”8
The story behind Clement’s resignation—a story still unfolding as of this
Article’s final edits in mid-2018—provides a window into the relationship
between the political leadership and the civil service at the Department in the
first year of the Trump administration. It also serves as a jumping-off point to
explore more fundamental questions. In particular, it occasions our revisiting the
value in having a civil service with some independence from politics. And it
prompts us to consider mechanisms by which that independence can be protected.
In Part I of this Article, I recount some of the major events that
precipitated Clement’s October 2017 resignation from the Department. The
most important of these was Clement’s sudden reassignment in June 2017 from
his position as a senior scientist and policy analyst to a job processing royalty
checks from fossil fuel companies. Clement alleges that he was reassigned in
retaliation for his work on and statements about the climate change-related

6.
7.

8.

Evan Halper, Interior Secretary Zinke Calls His Staff Disloyal in Speech to the Oil Industry,
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Sept. 26, 2017, 1:30 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/
sep/26/interior-secretary-zinke-calls-his-staff-disloyal-/ [https://perma.cc/PT3N-84TE].
Letter From Former Officials of the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/letterfrom-former-department-of-interior-officials/2574/ (referenced and linked to by Darryl
Fears, Interior Department Whistleblower Resigns, Calling Ryan Zinke’s Leadership a
Failure, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/10/04/whistleblower-resigns-keeping-my-voice-more-importantthan-keeping-my-job).
Letter From Joel Clement, Former Dir., Office of Policy Analysis, to Ryan Zinke, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior (Oct. 4, 2017), https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/
national/read-joel-clements-resignation-letter/2566 [https://perma.cc/MQ62-S57F].

1536

65 UCLA L. R EV. 1532 (2018)

needs of several Native Alaskan villages. Clement and other critics also suggest
that the mass reassignment of about thirty members of the Department’s Senior
Executive Service—including Clement’s reassignment—constituted an
unlawful effort to push senior civil servants out of the Department. In Part II, I
situate these events within a broader debate about the meaning of
accountability in the federal government. The Department’s alleged actions
suggest a very linear vision of accountability that demands full control by political
leadership over all employees and executive actions within an agency. In
contrast, I argue that pockets of political independence among agency employees
not only are compatible with, but also are necessary to ensure political and legal
accountability within and outside of an agency. From this perspective,
Clement’s allegations and the related facts known thus far are deeply troubling.
In Part III, I use Clement’s case to consider existing safeguards that protect the
political independence of civil servants and the conditions that give rise to and
sustain such safeguards.
I.

REASSIGNMENTS AT THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT

In Joel Clement’s words, he learned of his reassignment “in the dark of
night,” with no previous warning, after receiving a call from a colleague who
had also just been reassigned. Upon checking his email,9 Clement discovered a
mostly boilerplate letter, dated June 15, 2017, from Associate Deputy Director
James Cason.10 In the letter, Cason informed Clement that he would be
removed from his position as the Director of the OPA and made a Senior
Program Advisor with the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).11
ONRR collects and manages revenue payments for oil and gas leases on federal
lands.12
About half of the reassignment letter’s three substantive paragraphs
emphasized the mobility of the Senior Executive Service (SES). The SES is a
government-wide corps of high-level managers, mostly career appointees,

9.
10.
11.
12.

Interview with Joel Clement, Former Dir., Office of Policy Analysis, in D.C. (Dec. 5, 2017).
Memorandum From James Cason, Assoc. Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Joel
Clement (June 15, 2017) [hereinafter Reassignment Letter], https://www.doi.gov/sites/
doi.gov/ files/uploads/17-01174ch.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FA5-Z268].
Id.
OFF. OF NAT. RES. REVENUE, http://www.onrr.gov (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); see also Joel
Clement, Complaint of Possible Prohibited Personnel Practice or Other Prohibited
Activity, U.S. Office of Special Counsel 12, (July 12, 2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Clement OSC complaint].
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situated throughout federal agencies.13 Clement was a career member of the
SES.14 Apart from citing the SES’s mobility, the letter’s entire explanation for
Clement’s reassignment was as follows:
As the Director of the Office of Policy Analysis, you oversee crosscutting analysis and coordination to support decision-making and
policies. You oversee the development of the annual report on the
Department’s economic contributions to the National economy.
You are experienced at leading experts that provide objective
economic and policy analysis. You are well qualified to serve as
Senior Program Advisor of the Office of Natural Resources
Revenue.15

About a month after Clement received notice of his reassignment, he filed
a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC).16 In it,
he explained that he is a scientist and a policy expert. As Director of the
OPA, he had promoted climate change resilience for Native Alaskan
communities, including planning for the complex and expensive task of
relocating several imminently threatened villages. In contrast, Clement had no
training or experience relevant to the revenue collection and auditing work
done at ONRR.17
Clement charged that his reassignment was designed to keep him from
“work[ing] on mitigating the danger to Native Alaskan communities, to punish
[him] for [his] past such efforts, and to push [him] to quit.”18 In particular, he
alleged that he had been retaliated against for making several statements about
the danger to Native Alaskans. His statements included remarks to the United
Nations just six days before his reassignment, to the effect that Alaskan Native
“villages are sliding into the sea and the threats are growing.”19 Another was an
email that he sent on April 21, 2017 to the Special Assistant to the President for

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

Maeve P. Carey, The Senior Executive Service: Background and Options for Reform,
Congressional Research Service 1 (Sept. 6, 2012).
See Reassignment Letter, supra note 10 (referencing Clement’s SES membership and his
“career appointment”).
Id.
See Joel Clement, I’m a Scientist. I’m Blowing the Whistle on the Trump Administration,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-a-scientistthe-trump-administration-reassigned-me-for-speaking-up-about-climate-change/2017/
07/19/389b8dce-6b12-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html [https://perma.cc/5L95-XDNJ];
Clement OSC Complaint, supra note 12.
Clement OSC Complaint, supra note 12, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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International Energy and Environment. In the email, Clement emphasized the
“importance of building resilience” for at-risk Alaskan Native communities
and claimed that “coordinating the resilience efforts would save the federal
government money.”20 Clement also cited two similar statements as bases for
retaliation, both of which he had made at public speaking events.21
Clement argued that his statements constituted statutorily protected
whistleblowing activity,22 because they revealed a “substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety,”23 and because one of the statements revealed
a “gross waste of funds.”24 While members of the SES are subject to more lateral
mobility than most civil servants,25 they remain protected by the civil service
laws,26 including provisions against retaliation for protected disclosures.27
More broadly, SES members are protected against “arbitrary and capricious
actions,”28 and they may not be reassigned to positions for which they are
unqualified.29
Clement resigned from the Department on October 4, 2017. In his
resignation letter to Secretary Zinke, Clement wrote, among other things, that:
[R]eassigning and training me as an auditor when I have no
background in that field will involve an exorbitant amount of time
and effort on the part of my colleagues, incur significant taxpayer
expense, and create a situation in which these talented specialists are
being led by someone without experience in their field. I choose to
save them the trouble, save taxpayer dollars, and honor the
organization by stepping away to find a role more suited to my
skills. Secretary Zinke, you and your fellow high-flying Cabinet

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 7. In a “response continuation” section of his complaint, Clement noted that he also
had “disclosed the danger to Alaskan Native communities directly to other Interior
Officials and cited several examples of such disclosures. Id. at 12.
See id. at 4. This page of the complaint consists of the OSC’s own form indicating the types
of disclosures protected pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 6.
Email From Joshua A. Geltzer, Exec. Dir., Inst. for Constitutional Advocacy & Prot., to the
Honorable Adam Miles, Acting Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel 4 (Aug. 24,
2017).
5 U.S.C. § 3131(11) (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 2302 (a)(2)(A)(iv), (a)(2)(B), (b)(3), (b)(8), (b)(9) (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 3131(7) (2012).
Email From Joshua A. Geltzer et al., supra note 25, at 6 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3395(a)(1)(A)).
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officials have demonstrated over and over that you are willing to
waste taxpayer dollars, but I’m not.30

As of this Article’s writing, Clement’s OSC complaint remains pending.
Because Clement resigned, OSC cannot seek his reinstatement. OSC could,
however, declare that there is reasonable cause to believe that Clement was
retaliated against in violation of the civil service laws. It could also seek
payment of attorneys’ fees.31
Clement’s reassignment was part of a larger, mass reassignment of about
thirty SES members at the Department.32 The Department’s Inspector General
(IG) investigated that larger action recently, documenting its findings in an
April 2018 report.33 Eight U.S. Senate Democrats had requested the
investigation.34 In their request letter, the senators acknowledged that agency
heads have discretion to reassign senior executives but stressed that that
discretion has limits. In particular, they noted that SES employees may not be
reassigned in an effort to “force them to resign, to silence their voices, or to
punish them for the conscientious performance of their public duties.”35
As evidence that Zinke seeks to force SES members out through
undesirable reassignments, critics point to Zinke’s own testimony to a Senate
subcommittee to the effect that he plans to cut 4000 jobs at the Department,
and that he hopes to achieve this goal partly through reassignments.36 They

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

Letter From Joel Clement , supra note 8, at 2.
Interview with Katherine Atkinson, in D.C. (Dec. 5, 2017). See also 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b), (g)
(2012) (enumerating courses of action available to OSC, including remedies that it may
seek through the offending agency or through the Merit Systems Protection Board).
MARY L. KENDALL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REASSIGNMENT OF
SENIOR EXECUTIVES AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 4 (2018) [hereinafter INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT], https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/FinalEvaluation_SESRe
assignments_Public.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FCT-LAEB] (noting that between June 15,
2017 and October 29, 2017, the Department proposed reassigning 35 SES members and
did reassign 27 of them).
Id.
See Joe Davidson, Interior’s “Unusual” Transfer of Senior Executives Spurs Official Probe,
WASH. POST: POWERPOST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power
post/wp/2017/09/12/interiors-unusual-transfer-of-senior-executives-spurs-official-probe
[https://perma.cc/S899-92BW]; see also Letter From U.S. Senators, Comm. on Energy &
Nat. Res., to Mary L. Kendall, Deputy Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (July 24, 2017),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=files.serve&File_id=A8DB3B66E5B6-43D8-A98F-DEC7E512E51D [https://perma.cc/9LZX-JXYH].
Letter From U.S. Senators, supra note 34, at 1.
Fears, supra note 7. See also, e.g., Email From Joshua A. Geltzer et al., supra note 25, at 9
(noting that reassignments may not, under the CSRA, be used “to pressure Senior
Executives to quit”).
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also note that the scope of the mass reassignment action is highly unusual,37 and
that some of the reassignments move SES members “across the country . . . to
serve in . . . ill-fitting jobs.”38 They further observe that the reassignments were
noticed, though not effectuated, prior to the end of the four-month period in
which new administrations are statutorily barred from making SES
reassignments.39
In its April 2018 report, the IG concluded that the Department’s records
were so sparse and disjointed that the IG could not determine whether the
reassignments complied with the law.40 The IG explained that the Department
“did not document its plan or reasons for the reassignment decisions or
gather the information needed to make informed decisions.”41 Furthermore,
the Department’s Executive Resources Board (ERB)—the body that made the
reassignment decisions—offered “inconsistent” rationales to the IG.42 Given
these deficiencies, the IG was “prevented from making a clear determination
whether or not the DOJ met the legal requirements” for the reassignments.43
Throughout its factual findings, the IG elaborated on the premise
underlying its reluctance to draw legal conclusions—that is, that the ERB’s
decisionmaking process and documentation were weak. The IG noted, for
example, that none of the ERB members could provide an answer when asked
“who in the Departmental leadership ordered the reassignment[s].”44 The IG
37.
38.

39.

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

See Davidson, supra note 34.
Clement, supra note 16. See also Halper, supra note 6 (noting that several reassigned
senior executives who were “interviewed by the Los Angeles Times/Tribune Washington
Bureau said that they were puzzled” by the reassignments, “which sent them to corners of
the agency where they had no expertise”); Nicole Ogrysko, Interior Senior Executives Left
in the Dark Amid Reorg, Reassignments, FED. NEWS RADIO (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:15 PM),
https://federalnewsradio.com/ses/2017/08/interior-senior-executives-left-in-the-darkamid-reorg-reassignments [https://perma.cc/8YD4-KXYQ] (observing that many of the
senior executives’ “new roles vastly differ from the positions they once held and span other
fields and areas of expertise” and noting, with respect to geography, that one “was asked to
move from a position in Washington, D.C. to another in Alaska”).
Email From Joshua A. Geltzer et al., supra note 25, at 8 (“Whether or not [the timing]
violates the letter of the CSRA’s 120-day moratorium on reassignments . . . there can be no
doubt that the DOI’s conduct violates its spirit.”). The moratorium is imposed by 5 U.S.C.
§ 3395(e)(1).
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 32, at Cover Memorandum.
Id. See also id. at 5 (noting that the Department’s Executive Resources Board (ERB)
members “did not have meeting minutes, notes, voting or decision records, or other
documentation records for [their] meetings or for any other activities or discussions
related to the reassignments, other than photographs of poster boards”).
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
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also “found no documented evidence—nor [was it] provided a methodology or
record of discussion—that the ERB reviewed the senior executives’
qualifications before proposing reassignments.”45 Furthermore, despite
repeated questioning of each ERB member, the IG “only received broad
explanations” for the reassignments, which boiled down to three criteria:
“[t]ime in position,” “[m]oving senior executives out of the Washington, DC
area,” and “[m]oving senior executives to other functional areas to share
knowledge.”46 However, the IG “found no evidence that the ERB evaluated the
proposed reassignments against the three stated reasons.”47
The IG report also cited a lack of notice to, or consultation with, the parties
most directly impacted by the reassignments. The IG interviewed thirty-one of
the thirty-five SES members who had been scheduled for reassignment.48 Of the
thirty-one interviewed, twenty-nine had received no “indication of the
reassignment before receiving official notification.”49 Nor, “in the majority of
cases,” was a reassignee’s “supervisor, acting bureau director, [or] assistant
secretary . . . aware of the reassignment until hours before the ERB sent the
reassignment notifications.”50
Although the IG reached no conclusions as to whether the reassignment
decisions were politically motivated, it noted that all six of the ERB’s voting
members at the time of the reassignments51 were political appointees.52 The
Department added two career senior executives to the ERB in November 2017,
during the IG’s review.53 Of the thirty-one SES members interviewed for the IG
report, ten expressed suspicions that they were targeted for reassignment for
political or punitive reasons,54 and twelve “believed their reassignment may
have been related to their prior work assignments, including climate change,
energy, or conservation.”55

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Memorandum From Ryan Zinke, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Assoc. Deputy Sec’y
et al. (May 19, 2017) (establishing the ERB “[e]ffective the date of this memorandum” and
naming its members).
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 9.
Id. at 10. See also id. at 24 (app. 5).
Id. at 20–21 (app. 4); id. at 7.
Id. at 7. See also id. at 20–21 (app. 4).
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David L. Bernhardt, the Department’s Deputy Secretary and the ERB’s
Chair, submitted a two-page response to the IG report.56 Bernhardt’s only
remark on legality was that “I continue to believe the actions taken by the ERB
and covered in the [IG Report] are lawful.”57 He agreed, however, that
“improvements” would be desirable, and wrote that he has initiated some
changes.58 For example, he cites the addition of two career SES employees to
the ERB in November 2017,59 as well as his efforts to identify “best practices for
managing SES reassignments.”60
II.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE CIVIL SERVICE

At the heart of the controversy over the reassignments at the Department
are divergent philosophies about the meaning of accountability in the federal
government. Because Clement’s OSC investigation is still pending, we do not
yet know the full array of defenses that the Department may raise. Nonetheless,
the timing, scope, and nature of the reassignments, the apparent laxity of the
procedures followed, and the sparse and generic cast of the justifications
articulated thus far suggest an aggressively narrow reading of the relevant civil
service laws, if not a disregard for them. When juxtaposed with Secretary
Zinke’s comments about disloyalty throughout the Department, and with
similar warnings of a bureaucratic deep state by other administration members
and supporters, the reassignments may reflect something more fundamental
still—that is, a suspicion of anyone in the Department not appointed by the
current president or his own political appointees. Such suspicion itself suggests
a very linear, top-down vision of accountability in the executive branch. In this
vision, which is closely associated with unitary executive theory, the president
must have full control of all discretionary executive activity and personnel in

56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

More precisely, Bernhardt responded to a draft of the report that the IG shared with him
prior to the report’s public release. Memorandum From David L. Bernhardt, Deputy Sec’y,
Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Mary L. Kendall, Deputy
Inspector Gen. (Mar. 30, 2018), in INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 22–24
(app. 5).
Id. at 23 (app. 5).
Id.
Id. at 24 (app. 5). See also id. at 10.
Id. at 24 (app. 5). He places most of the blame for past problems on the Obama
administration’s failure to adopt Office of Personnel Management recommendations, id.
at 23 (app. 5), and on “delays in confirming key presidentially nominated, Senate
confirmed officers” since January 20, 2017. Id. at 23 (app. 5).
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the federal government.61 Only when executive branch officials are fully
accountable to the president in this way can the president truly be responsible
for executing the law, and thus be fully accountable to the people at the ballot
box.62
If the Department’s actions and statements thus far suggest a conception
of accountability that demands broad political control of the civil service, then
the pushback that Secretary Zinke has faced, and the civil service laws invoked
by Clement and others, reflect a more complex vision of accountability.63
Proponents of the latter vision acknowledge that the bureaucracy is not and
ought not to be fully disconnected from political control in light of the
president’s political and constitutional responsibilities. Yet they also recognize
that the president himself is constrained by legislative and political directives.
Unfettered presidential control of the executive branch would enable the
president to evade such directives and thus to dodge legal and political
accountability. From this perspective, some degree of political independence

61.

62.
63.

Elsewhere, I have detailed these aspects of unitary executive theory. See, e.g., Heidi
Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1742, 1746–48 (2009) (citing,
inter alia, Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 35–37, 45, 59, 65–66 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158,
1166 (1992); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 97–99 (1994); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991,
998–99, 1012–15 (1993)).
See supra note 61.
This more complex vision is manifest in scholarship contesting unitary executive theorists’
conception of accountability. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 61, at 1748–50 (citing, inter
alia, Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
531, 552–59, 564–65 (1998); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against
Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 992–1007, 1017–20 (1997);
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1785 (1996); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of
Administrative Law, 5 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 12–15, 35–38 (2005); Peter M.
Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613–14 (1989); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and
the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2076–83, 2119, 2121–22, 2134–
35 (2005); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–209 (1995)). For a
more recent example of a relatively complex vision of accountability in the administrative
state, see JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP 64, 176–77 (2017) (associating an
“administrative separation of powers,” including a professional civil service, with legal and
political accountability). Cf. PAUL VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY 1 (2017) (arguing that
bureaucratic professionalism provides “energy” that “ensures directed, purposeful, and
accountable government”).
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within the executive branch is not only permissible but is necessary to preserve
accountability.64
A group of legal scholars articulated this more nuanced vision of
accountability in an August 2017 letter to the OSC regarding Clement’s
complaint. Extant statutory protections for members of the SES, they wrote,
“enable[] Senior Executives to insist that the political leadership act fairly and
rationally and comply with congressionally and judicially imposed mandates
and thereby to help enforce limits on the invocation of Executive Branch
authority consistent with our overarching constitutional commitment to the
checking and balancing of Federal power.”65 At the same time, they stressed
that “Senior Executives are entitled only to freedom from undue political
influence, not to autonomy to pursue their own policy aims.”66
Elsewhere, I have explained why I believe that a more complex vision of
accountability, such as that expressed in the legal scholars’ letter, is superior—
both as a matter of constitutional law and as a matter of good policy—to an
approach that relies on unitary presidential accountability. In addition to the
arguments recounted above, I have explained that checks on presidential
power, including civil service protections, can further accountability by
fostering transparency about government abuse or incompetence, and about
the evidentiary backdrop against which government decisions are made.67
Indeed, unfettered political control of civil servants can defeat
accountability by enabling political actors to manipulate the information that
emerges from the executive branch. For instance, such political actors could
suppress or alter research that reflects best scientific practices, but that is at
odds with an administration’s policy goals. This would distort the very factual
picture against which the public, Congress, and the courts can assess executive
actions.68
Clement’s allegations demonstrate precisely how excessive political
control of civil servants can hinder accountability by manipulating the
information the public receives and molding it to reflect political imperatives,
rather than scientific or other expertise. Clement’s conclusions about the
imminent danger to several Alaskan Native villages, and the need to relocate
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See supra note 63.
Email From Joshua A. Geltzer et al., to the Honorable Adam Miles, supra note 25, at 8.
Id.
See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY , EXECUTIVE POWER,
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 163–66, 172–73, 179–94 (2015); Kitrosser, supra note 62, at
1760–74.
Email From Joshua A. Geltzer et al., supra note 25, at 8.
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those villages, stemmed from his years of work and research at the Department
in which he repeatedly met with delegations from the affected villages, chaired
an international body of eight Arctic nations, and worked with officials from
Alaska and agencies across the federal government.69 If Clement’s allegations
of whistleblower retaliation are true, they reflect much more than a new
administration’s disagreement with the policy conclusions that stem from his
work. Rather, they mark an effort to prevent the public, and even other
government officials, from understanding the work itself, and thus from
grasping the factual bases underlying the (now) rejected policy goals.
III.

THE ECOLOGY OF CIVIL SERVANT INDEPENDENCE

In an important law review article, Seth Kreimer writes of the ecology of
transparency.70 Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as his focal
point, he explains that FOIA cannot succeed in isolation. Rather, it requires an
ecosystem of supportive factors. For example, “[f]or FOIA requests to
generate illuminating documents, they must be precisely framed, and
framing such requests requires knowledge regarding the activities to be
illuminated.”71 Such knowledge can come from whistleblowers who leak
information, from members of the press who publish the same, or from civil
servants—with some structural independence from the White House—who
disclose politically inconvenient information in the course of their duties.72
Just as a protected civil service is part of the ecosystem that supports
FOIA, so civil service independence, and the accountability and transparency
that independence enables, require a network of supportive factors. The most
obvious such supports are statutory civil service protections. Yet those too
must contain sufficiently robust provisions and be buttressed by factors that
include a free press, meaningful congressional oversight, and an independent
judiciary.
69.

70.
71.
72.

Interview with Joel Clement, supra note 9; Clement OSC Complaint, supra note 12, at 6–8,
12. Also relevant in this regard is a major report that Clement coauthored on arctic
warming. See JOEL P. CLEMENT ET AL., INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON COORDINATION OF
DOMESTIC ENERGY DEV. & PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY
CHANGING ARCTIC: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2013), https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/
publications/misc_pdf/iamreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8LJ-H6QX].
Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1011 (2008).
Id. at 1025.
See id. at 1037–45. The success of a FOIA request, once made, also depends on a network
of supporting factors. See id. at 1047, 1056.
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Consider what Clement’s case, as it has developed thus far, tells us about
some of the factors that comprise an ecology of civil service independence.
Clement has invoked the statutory prohibition against employers taking certain
personnel actions, including reassignments, to retaliate for disclosures that an
employee “reasonably believes evidences . . . a gross waste of funds . . . or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”73 This statutory
provision exists in no small part because of the decades-long efforts of public
interest organizations and other whistleblower advocates within civil society.
For example, the Government Accountability Project (GAP), since its founding
in 1978, has lobbied for and helped to shape virtually every major piece of
federal whistleblower legislation in the United States, as well as much state
legislation.74 The fruits of these efforts include the first comprehensive federal
government whistleblower law of the modern era, the 1978 Civil Service
Reform Act,75 and important improvements to it in the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 198976 and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
of 2012 (WPEA).77 Among other things, the WPEA reversed judicial
interpretations of earlier legislation that GAP and other whistleblower
advocates had considered deeply problematic.78 For example, the WPEA
specified that disclosures may not be excluded from protection because they
were “made during the normal course of duties of an employee,” to “a
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) (2012).
See MARK HERTSGAARD, BRAVEHEARTS: WHISTLE-BLOWING IN THE AGE OF SNOWDEN 59–76
(2016). See also Interview with Louis Clark, Exec. Dir., Gov’t Accountability Project, in
D.C. (Dec. 7, 2017).
See JON O. SHIMABUKURO & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW (Sept. 13, 2012) (noting that
whistleblower “protections were first adopted for federal employees” in the 1978 Civil
Service Reform Act (CSRA)). See also Interview with Louis Clark, supra note 74
(discussing GAP’s involvement with the CSRA in 1978).
HERTSGAARD, supra note 74, at 60 (citing GAP’s involvement in passage of 1989 Act);
Interview with Louis Clark, supra note 74 (discussing 1989 Act and GAP’s involvement in
its passage).
HERTSGAARD, supra note 74, at 60–61 (citing GAP’s involvement in passage of
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA)); Interview with Louis Clark, supra
note 74 (discussing WPEA and GAP’s involvement in its passage).
See, e.g., WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2012, S. REP. 112-155, at 1–3
(2012) (“The Federal Circuit has wrongly accorded a narrow definition to the type of
disclosure that qualifies for whistleblower protection”—the legislation “would address
these problems by restoring the original congressional intent of the WPA . . . .”); Jason
Zuckerman, Congress Strengthens Whistleblower Protections for Federal Employees, 2012
A.B.A. SEC. LABOR & EMP. L. (“[S]everal Federal Circuit decisions . . . creat[ed] loopholes
that were contrary to Congressional intent,” and WPEA closes those loopholes); Interview
with Louis Clark, supra note 74 (making similar points).
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supervisor or to a person who participated in [the disclosed] activity,” or
“not . . . in writing.”79 In lobbying for the WPEA, GAP was joined by a number
of other groups under the banner of the Make It Safe Coalition, which included
the Project on Government Oversight, Public Citizen, the Union of Concerned
Scientists, and the American Federation of Government Employees.80
Of course, civil society cannot pass legislation by itself. It needs willing
members of Congress with whom to work and, ultimately, a majority of each
house of Congress and presidential support.81 Some of that support itself may
stem from lobbying by private organizations and constituents. Media coverage
can bolster support as well. In the case of the WPEA, for example, GAP joined
forces with the National Public Radio program On the Media to launch a
crowdsourcing project to determine which senator had placed a secret hold on
the bill after it had passed both the Senate and the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2010.82 Among other things, the effort generated publicity
in favor of reintroducing the WPEA in the next Congress.83
Once legislation passes, multiple factors shape the ecosystem in which it
will succeed or fail. Among the most important factors are the enforcement
mechanisms available to implement the law. In the case of the WPEA and its
predecessor statutes, alleged whistleblowers can file complaints with OSC, as
did Clement. OSC is empowered to investigate the complaints and take
subsequent actions, including recommending disciplinary measures and
lodging complaints with the Merit Systems Protection Board.84
Apart from the powers provided to the OSC by statute, the quality of its
leadership is a significant determinant of success. For example, the tenure of
Special Counsel Scott Bloch during the George W. Bush administration was
referred to by one whistleblower advocate as a “pathetic chapter” in which
“[d]edicated federal workers [were] left to hang without a protector on their

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 122-199, 126 Stat. 1465,
at § 101(b)(2)(C) (amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(f)(1)–(2)). See also Zuckerman, supra note
78 (citing these changes).
See Dylan Blaylock, Statement of Make It Safe Coalition on 25th Anniversary of
Whistleblower Protection Act (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.whistleblower.org/blog/
04102014-statement-make-it-safe-coalition-25th-anniversary-whistleblower-protection-act
[https://perma.cc/H6XZ-MCHJ].
Or, in lieu of presidential support, legislative passage could occur with a two-thirds
majority of each house of the U.S. Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Blow the Whistle!, WNYC, https://www.wnyc.org/blowthewhistle [https://perma.cc/C2RJQSBK].
See id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 1212 (a)(2)(B), 1215(a).
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side.”85 Bloch resigned under pressure following allegations that he had himself
engaged in improper personnel actions—including sexual orientation
discrimination and politicized hiring.86 Bloch also pled guilty to criminal
contempt of Congress for withholding evidence concerning his conduct at
OSC.87 In contrast, Carolyn Lerner was widely praised for her recently
completed term as Special Counsel.88 The Republican and Democratic cochairs of the House Whistleblower Protection Caucus credited Lerner with
“increas[ing] both the number of claims [OSC] investigates and the number of
cases resolved.”89 Because the Special Counsel is appointed “by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,”90 senators can influence the
selection. Media coverage, as well as pressure from the public and from civil
society, also may impact the selection.
The press and public interest groups also can shine a spotlight on
individual cases. For example, Clement’s attorney shared with me her sense, as
of early December 2017, that OSC had been unusually responsive to Clement’s
complaint. She observed that she had “never seen OSC move so quickly in
investigating.” She received “a call from investigators within a week of filing the

85.
86.

87.

88.

89.
90.

Joe Davidson, Workers Applaud Special Counsel’s Return to Private Sector, WASH. POST
(Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/21/
AR2008102102572.html [https://perma.cc/YG22-JA7T] (internal quotations omitted).
See Dan Friedman, OSC Chief Announces He Will Resign on Jan. 5, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 20,
2008), https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2008/10/osc-chief-announces-he-will-resignon-jan-5/27894/ [https://perma.cc/L27X-QC7F]; Carrie Johnson, Special Counsel Bloch
Resigns Under Pressure, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/23/AR2008102303204.html [https://perma.cc/HWT7-ENAV].
The Inspector General for the Office of Personnel Management issued a report in 2013
validating a number of the claims against Bloch. See Letter From Patrick E. McFarland to
the Honorable Carolyn N. Lerner (Dec. 5, 2013) (transmitting Final Report of
Investigation into March 3, 2005 and March 31, 2005 Complaints Filed with the Office of
Special Counsel).
Ann E. Marimow, Sentencing Postponed for Scott Bloch, Former Head of the Office of
Special Counsel, WASH. POST (May 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
sentencing-postponed-for-scott-bloch-former-head-of-the-office-of-special-counsel/
2013/05/13/1bc6ff56-bbe1-11e2-9b09-1638acc3942e_story.html [https://perma.cc/VB878SV2]; Press Release, FBI, Former Head of U.S. Office of Special Counsel Pleads Guilty to
Criminal Contempt of Congress (Apr. 27, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
washingtondc/press-releases/2010/wfo042710.htm [https://perma.cc/U3UH-T68S].
See Joe Davidson, Special Counsel Lerner Leaves Office as Trump Rejects Highly Praised
Whistleblower Advocate, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (June 7, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/06/07/lerner-leaves-office-of-special-counsel-astrumps-rejects-highly-praised-whistleblower-advocate/.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2012).
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complaint,” whereas “[u]sually it’s two to three months.”91 She attributes such
responsiveness partly to the unusual level of public attention paid to Clement’s
case.92 On the same day that Clement filed his complaint with OSC, he also
published an op-ed in The Washington Post. In the op-ed, he wrote of the mass
reassignments at the Department, including his own, and characterized them as
efforts to “[s]ilenc[e] civil servants, stifl[e] science, squander[] taxpayer money
and spurn[] communities in the face of imminent danger . . . .”93 The op-ed
generated considerable attention, which, in turn, led to further media scrutiny
of the Department’s reassignments. Clement also received assistance from the
Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection (the Institute) at
Georgetown University Law Center. The Institute sent a detailed letter to OSC,
on behalf of thirteen scholars of constitutional, administrative, and civil service
law, urging OSC to “conduct a thorough investigation” into Clement’s
complaint.94
Clement’s op-ed also seemed to spark interest on Capitol Hill. While
there had been some congressional inquiry into the Department’s
reassignments prior to the op-ed,95 Clement’s reassignment was singled out in
subsequent oversight requests made by House and Senate Democrats to
Secretary Zinke and to the Department’s Inspector General.96 Apart from the
light that these requests shed on the influence of Clement’s op-ed, they remind
us of the important roles that Inspectors General and members of Congress can
play in contributing to an ecology of civil service independence. Of course, as
with the leadership of the OSC, it matters a great deal who fills these positions.
Historically, levels of commitment to civil service independence have varied
widely among members of Congress and among Inspectors General. While

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

96.

Interview with Katherine Atkinson, supra note 31.
Id.
Clement, supra note 16.
Email From Joshua A. Geltzer et al., supra note 25.
See Letter From Tom Udall, Senator, to Sec’y Ryan Zinke, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (July
11, 2017) (expressing concern and seeking information about mass reassignments in
Udall’s capacity as Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies).
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. See also Letter From Tom Carper, Heidi
Heitkamp, and Tom Udall, U.S. Senators, to Sec’y Ryan Zinke, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
(Aug. 21, 2017); Letter From Elijah E. Cummings, U.S. Rep., to Sec’y Ryan Zinke, U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior (Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with author).
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both groups have had members devoted to civil service independence, both also
have had members who actively enable agency politicization.97
CONCLUSION
While politics has a perfectly legitimate role to play in the administrative
state, that role is not unlimited. Neither the president nor his appointees have,
nor should they have, unbridled power to reshape agencies in their political
images. To be sure, such power would enhance agency political accountability
in one very narrow sense. That is, it would heighten administrative
responsiveness to the will of the nationally elected and highly visible president.
Yet any positive effect would be dwarfed by the negative repercussions for other
aspects of political and legal accountability. Among other things, political
control over career experts can stifle the emergence of truthful, but politically
inconvenient, information from their departments.
Joel Clement’s allegations, and the larger factual context in which they
arise, illustrate the dangers that excessive political control poses to expertise
and truthful information flow, both in and from the administrative state. Yet
these events also highlight some of the safeguards currently in place to protect
against these threats. More broadly, Clement’s story provides occasion to
consider the many components that can comprise—and those that can
undermine—an ecology of accountability and civil service independence
throughout the administrative state.

97.

See, e.g., Interview with Louis Clark, supra note 74 (noting that Inspectors General are a
“mixed bag” with respect to whistleblower protections).

